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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick* and Brad Eric Scheler**

Superpriority Status for
Inadequately Protected Secured
Creditors: Not Just for the
Asking

The rights of secured creditors are
affected inimediately upon the filing
of a bankruptcy petition by or
against the debtor. In particular, the
.filing results in the automatic stay
of the enforcement of liens against
1
1 the debtor's assets. The ~aqkruptcy
Code also provides that the,debtor
may continue to use its property, including collateral securing prebank·ruptcy obligations, in tlie 9rdinary
course of business. 2 However, the
Code entitles the secured creditor to
"adequate protection" of its security
interest. 3 If the secured creditor's
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for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 See 11 U.S.C. §§362(a) (4) and (a)(5).
2 See 11 U.S.C. §363(c).
3 Although adequate protection is not
defined in the Bankruptcy Code, Section 361
of the Code sets forth the manner in which
it may be provided.

interest is not adequately protected,
the court is required to grant its request for relief from the automatic
stay or its reque~t for an order prohibiting or conditioning use of the
collateral necessary to provide adequate protection. 4
A common example of a secured
creditor not being ad~quately protected is when the value of collateral securing the creditor's claim is
deteriorating or depreciating below
the balance of the debt so that the
passage of time will erode the
creditor's lien, thereby increasing
the unsecured portion of the debt.
When the secured creditor seeks relief from the stay or an order prohibiting or conditioning use of the
collateral, it is common for the
trustee or debtor in possession to
respond with an offer of adequate
protection in the form of an additional lien on unencumbered assets
or periodic cash payments. 5 If the
secured creditor consents and the
court approves the granting of the
additional protection, or if in a contested p:coceeding the court finds that
the additional protection is adequate,
the trustee or debtor will likely continue to use the collateral in the ordinary course of business, thereby
benefitting the estate.
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See 11 U.S. C. §§ 362(d) and 363(e).
11 U.S.C. §361.

5 See
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But what happens if the protection
the court found to be "adequate"
later proves to be inadequate because
of an unexpected further deterioration in the value of the collateral?
To address this problem, Congress
included in the Bankruptcy Code
another form of protection for secured creditors, commonly called
"superpriority" administrative expense treatment. That is, to the extent that the "adequate protection"
provided subsequently falls short in
protecting the collateral value, and
the secured creditor has an administrative expense claim due to the
postpetition us~ of the collateral, its
administrative expense claim will be
entitled to priority above all other
administrative expenses. This extra
protection for secured creditors is
found in Section 507(b) of the Code,
which provides:
If the trustee, under section 362 [automatic stay], 363 [use, sale or lease
of property of the estate], or 364
[postpetition financing] of this title,
provides adequate protection of the
interest of a holder of a claim _secured
by a lien on property of the debtor and
if, notwithstanding such protection,
such creditor has a claim allowable
under subsection (a)(l) of this section
[administrative expenses] arising
from the stay of action against such
property under section 362 of this
title, from the use, sale, or lease of
such property under section 363 of
this title, or from the granting of a lien
under section 364(d) of this title, then
such creditor's claim under such subsection shall have priority over every
other claim under such subsection. 6
6 See
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Suppose that a secured creditor
moves for relief from the stay based
on its belief that its collateral is depreciating below the amount of the
debt balance. Suppose further that
the court disagrees with the secured
creditor, finds that the collateral is
worth considerably more than the
debt and is not depreciating significantly, and permits the trustee or
debtor to continue to use the collateral in its business. However, later
in the case, the court revisits the
question of collateral value and finds
that, notwithstanding its earlier decision, the collateral depreciated at
~n unexpectedly rapid rate and, in
fact, the secured creditor became
substantially unsecured as a result of
the continuation of the automatic
stay. Clearly, the court was wrong~
when it first decided that the secured
creditor was adequately protected by
its original collateral. So, is the secured creditor entitled to a
"superptiority" administrative expense claim under Section 507(b) to
the extent that it is harmed by the
unexpected decrease in collateral
value?- This legal issue was addressed by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
New York in LNC Investments, Inc.
v. First Fidelity Bank,? a case involving a dispute between two non-debtors arising out of the Eastern Airlines
bankruptcy.
The Eastern Airlines Financing

In 1986, Eastern Airlines engaged
in a sale/leaseback transaction as a
7

11 U.S.C. §507(b).
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means of optaining secured financipg. Eastern sold. 1l0 aircraft to a
newlY..created trust ~at leased them
back' to Eastern. The trust issued
three series of bonds.----called equipmen( trust certificates with total principal yalue of $500 million-to raise
the ,money needed to purchase the
aircraft. Eastern was obligated to
make lease payments in an amount
suf{icient, to cover the principal a~d
interest on the bonds. Title to the aircraft was held in trust as collateral
for the bonds.
In March of 1989, when Eastern
filed a chapter 11 petition, there were
104 aircraft remaining as collateral
with an appraised value of approximately $682 million. Because the
principal amount of the outstanding
bonds· was approximately $454 million, the bondb,olders were oversecured at that time to the extent of
$228 million.
The collateral value declined significantly within the next year or so.
On November 9, 1990, the appraised
value of the 67 aircraft remaining in
the collateral pool, together with
funds set aside in a cash .collateral
account from the sales and leases of
the 37 aircraft that were no longer
in the"collateral pool, was between
$475 million and $590 million. This
alarmed the trustees of the equipment trust wbo, one year a.nd 8
moriths after the commencement of
the Chapter 11 case, on November
14, 19~0, filed a' motion in the bankruptcy court requesting adequ,ate
protection under Section 363(e) of
the Code, which requires the court
to prohibit or condition use of col-

lateral necessary to provide adequate
protection to a secured creditor. Alternatively, the motion requested relief from the automatic stay under
Section 362(d) for lack of adequate
protection. The motion was pending
when, on January 18, '1991, Eastern
ceased all operations and stipulated
to the return of the remaining aircraft
and cash collateral to the trustee of
the equipment trust.
The continued deterioration of the
·value of the aircraft (which was exacerbated by the termination of
Eastern's business operations) left
the bondholders undersecured with
a large unsecured deficiency claim.
The holders of the second and third
series of bonds, which were subordinated to the holders of the first series, were left with only a general
unsecured deficiency claim andlike all other general unsecured
creditors-they received no recovery from the Eastern Airlines estate
because the assets in the estate were
not even sufficient to pay all administrative expe~ses. The unhappy
bondholders then coq1menced an
action against the trustees of the
equipment trust claiming that the
trustees breached their fiduciary
duty by waiting too long b~fore filing their motion for an order prohibiting or conditioning use of the
collateral or for relief from the automatic stay.
The bondholders could not prevail
in their action against the trustees of
the equipment trust unless they could
demonstrate that the delay in filing
the adequate protection/lift stay
motion caused them monetary harm.
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The bondholders claimed that they
were damaged by the delay because
if the motion had been made very
early in the cas~which most likely
would have been denied because of
the high appraised collateral value
at that time-the bondholders as secured creditors would have been
entitled to superpriority status under
Section 507(b).
In contrast, the trustees as defendants took the position that the delay in filing the motion did not harm
or damage the ·bondholders. They
argued that any motion for adequate
protection or relief from the automatic stay early in the case would
have been denied because the value
of the bondholders' .collateral at that
time.exceeded th~ .deqt balance by
more than $200 million. Moreover,
if the motion had been made and
denied, the bondholders would not
have been entitled to superpriority
status under Section 507(b). The
defendants argued that Section
507(b) applies only when an adequate protection or ljft stay motion
is granted-not denied-and additional protection is conferred which
subsequently proves inadequate.
Accordingly, the legal issue in this
dispute between two non-debtors
was whether Section 507(b)
superpriority treatmen~ would .have
been applicable if an adequate protectionflift stay motion were made
and denied based on a finding that
the collateral was sufficient to adequately protect the secured creditor, and the collateral subsequently
proves to be inadequate. The district
court in LNC Investments com-

mented that Section 507(b) andrelated· sections of the Code have created "a complex maze of ambiguous
statutory provisions and opaque, inconsistent case law, " 8 and noted
that there were no decisions sqvarely
on point or any dispositive legislative history with regard to this issue.
The precise question presented "is
an open one in the courts. ' 79
Defendants' Plain Meaning
Argument

Defendants supported their argument that a denial of an adequate
protection/lift stay motion would not
trigger superpriority status with a 1\teral ·reading of the introductory
phra's~,s of ~ection 507(b), as it
would b'e'read in the context of a
chapter 1'1 case· with a deb~or in po~
session:
the [debtor in possession], under section 362, 363, or 364
of this title [title 11 ], provides adequate protection ... " 10
The 'defendants argu~d that the
present tense form of the verb "provides" is consistent only with the
view that adequate protection must
be provided after the filing of a chapter 11 petition, "a temporal concept

··:u

1 247 B.R. at 41-42, quoting from
Baybank-Middlesex v. Ralar Distributors,
Inc., 69 F.3d 1200, 1204 (1st Cir. 1995).
9 247 B.R. at43.
10
In a Chapter 11 case in which there is
a debtor in possession, there is no trustee.
Rather, the debtor.in possession has the righfS
and powers of a trustee and would be entitled to the benefits of Section 507(b).
Therefore, in the quoted phrase from Section 507(b), the words "debtor in possession"
are substituted for the word "trustee." See
11
§ 1107.
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reinforced by the requirement that
the protect1on covered by §507(b)
must be provided by the 'debtor-inpossession,' a status which a debtor
attains onfy after a petition is
fHed!' 1.1· De.fendants argued that
Eastern Airlines was not a debtor in
possession in 1986 when it provided
"adequate protection'1-i.e., title to
its aircraft as collaterat for the
bonds-and, therefore, Eastern did
no~ "provide adequate protection"
within the meaning of Section
507(b). Moreov~r. Section 507(b)
states that adequate protection must
be pr9vided' "unde..r" sec~ion 362,
363, or 364 of the Ban~I?t«?Y Code.
;;tlte~e sections govern aq~,uat~ pro;te~iion granted in the cQrltext of a
:t~uest for relief from the, automatic
~.~tay, t h e use, sa1e or 1ease
Jl 'f
9 prop.~rty of the bankruptcy estate, or financing during the bankiuptcy case.
Defendants argued that iri order to
get adequate pro~~ction under Section 362, 363, or 364, a l;>ankruptcy
petition must have been filed already.
Bondholders' Policy Argumel),t

Plaintiff bondholders responded
by contending that the literal reading of Section 507(b) contravenes
the relevant purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, which is to.protect secured creditors. They cited Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 12
where the Supreme Court stated that
if a literal construction of the words
11

of a statute are "absurd," it must be
construed in a way to avoid the absurdity. The district court in LNC
Investments summarized the bondholders' policy argument as follows:
"In the case at bar, the Bondholders
argue that with respect to a secured
creditor's ultimate ·loss, there is no
principled difference between a bankruptcy court's ordering additional protection which later proves. to be
inadequate, and the court's denying
that relief based upon t}le equally erroneous conclusion that the pre-existing protection is adequate. In both
instances, the bankruptcy court's error and the adverse consequences to
the secured creditor are precisely the
same." 13

In pursuing their damage clai'ms
against the trustees, the bondholders argued for abtoad interpretation
of Section 507(b). In their view, an
oversecured creditor witli a substantial equity cushion at the start of the
case may obtain superpriority administrative expense status simply
by filing a motion to lift the automatic stay or for adequate protection. Under the bondholders' view,
the merits or denial ofthe motion are
irrelevant; by filing the motion the
secured creditor is guaranteed
superpriority status· in the event that
the collateral later proves to be inadequate to protect the creditor's
entire claim.
The district court commented that
both parties advanced reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statute and that both were correct when

247 B.R. at 46.

12 143

u.s. 457, 460 (1892).

13
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they argued that Congress could
have expressed itself more clearly,
.,ut the arguments cancel each other
out." 14 The court was left with the
task of choosing between "irreconcilable statutory constructions, each
having a surface plausibility." 15
The district court began its analysis of the statute by quoting language
written by Justice Scalia when he
wrote for the Supreme Court in
United Savings Association of Texas
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. : 16

the automatic stay or for adequate
prQtec:tion, the bankruptcy court. denies the motion based on a fip<;ting
that the creditor ~lready is adequately ptQtected, and the creditor's
collateral subsequently proves inadequate to cover the. claim. 18
In reaching its decision, the district court found that the bondholders' reading of Section 507(b),
although permissible, was a "stretching of language.:'
"It is a stretch to read §507(b)'s'reference to a·'debtor-in-possession' as
including an entity that became a
'debtor' by means of the underlying
transaction, at a time when becoming
a 'debtpr-in-possession' was the last
thing <Jn:rone wanted.

"Statutory construction, however, is
a holistic endeavor; A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is
oftcrn clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme-because the same
terminology is used elsewhere in a
context that m*es itS meaning clear,
or because only one of the permissible
me~nings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest
of the law." 17

It is equally a stretch to read §507(b)'s
use of tl:ie present tense verb 'provides' as including a bankruptcy
court's order deny.ing an adequate
protection motion 'on the ground that
in the past, that is to say prepetitjon,
a debtor had provided collateral ostensiply sufficient to secure the claim
of the moving creditor... They [Bondholders] must argue that for purposes
of qualifying for superpriority status
under §507(b), a court's order denying adequate pr~tection is the functional equivalent of a debtor-inpossession's providing that protection
in response to a court order granting
it. The semantic obstacles to that interpretation are apparent." 19

District Court Adopts Narrower
Construction

The district court, applying these
interpretive aids, concluded that the
narrower construction of Section
507(b) advocated by the defendant
trustees is the better one. Accordingly, the court held that a secured
creditor's claim is not entitled to
superpriority administrative expense
priority _under s'ection 507(b) if the
creditor files a motion for relief from
14

247 B.R. at 47.
247 B.R. at 47.
16 484 u.s. 365 (1988).
11
/d. at 371.
15
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18
The district court indicated that, as a
result of this decision, it will so instruct the
jury, which will have to decide whether the
plaintiff bondholders were damaged by the
trustees' delay in filing a motion for relief
from the stay or fof adequate protection in
the Eastern Airlines'bankruptcy case.
19
247 B.R. at 47. Although the court repeatedly referred to the words "debtor-in-
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The court also agreed with the
defendants' argument that the reference in Section 507(b) to a debtor in
possession who "under section 362,
363, or 364 of this title, provides
adequate prote~tion" demonstrates
the limited nature of the superpriority benefit conferred on secured
creditors.
"That language conjures up the image of a debtor providing adequate
protection to a secured creditor in
obedience to the bankruptcy, court's
order granting a motion brought by
the creditor under one of the three designated sections." 20

The court also reasoned that, because the statutory language "in,clines sufficiently in favor of the
~
'
_J'rustees,"21 the bondhofq.prs had the
. \>urden to show that the trpstee's
lnarrower interpretation· is "absurd"
·in view of th'e objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code-a burden the
court concluded they failed to satisfy. The court noted that the Bankruptcy Code has many objectives,
one of whi.ch is the rehabilitation of
the debtor, and that Congress has a
preference for reorganization as opposed to liquidation. In that context,
the court observed tqat "a superpriority claim is the natural enemy of a

reorganization," 22 because the presence of a substantial superpriority
claim "may chili the willingness of
others to do business wi~ a debtorin-possession, dooming that resolution preferred by Congre$s, a
successful reorganization, ~nd leading to liquidation."23 Although Congress has the power to enact a statute
that would give an oversecured
creditor maximum protection at the
expense of the reorganization preference, the district court concluded
that Congress did not do so in Section 507(b).
"I think that the Code protects secured
creditors up to a point, but not beyond,
and the point of demarcation is
reached when granting superpriority
status would imperil other identifiable
objectives of the Code, which include
a preference for economically feasible
reorganizations." 24

The court cited no decisions that
directly expressed this view, but it
did find agreement in Collier on
Bankruptcy.

possession" in Section 507(b), those words
do not actually appear in that subsection. As
discussed in note 10, supra, the word
"trustee" in Section 507(b) is read to include
a debtor in possession by reason of Section
1107 of the Code which gives the debtor in
possession the rights and powers of a trustee
in a chapter 11 case.
20
/d. at 49.
21
/d. at48.
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"If the property in question declines
in value between the time that adequate protection is provided and the
time that the property is returned to
the cn:;ditor, the creditor will be entitled to a section 507(b) priority for
the amount of the decline. It should
be kept in mind, however, that the
creditor is not automatically entitled
to a priority, for the decline in value
but is so entitled only where the creditor has specifically been provided
with adequate protection. If a court
22Jd.
23
/d. at49.
24Jd.

~ORMCOMMEROALCODELAWJOUNAL

declines to grant relief from the stay
because the court determines that no
cause exists or that the creditor is adequately protected by the value of the
collateral or by other factors, the
creditor has not been granted adequate protection. If the court believes
that the value of the property is not
likely to decrease in value and declines to terminate the automatic·stay
on that basis, there is no grant of adequate protection a'nd a creditor
should not be entitled to assert a section 507(b) claim merely because the
court's belief proves to be incorrect
and the property actually does decline
in value."lS

Conclusion

The district court in LNC Investments ,neld that, in order for a· secured creditor's claim to be entitled
to superpriority. status under
§507(b), adequate protection must
have been previously provided by
the trustee or debtor in possession
during the bankruptcy case. The filing of a motion for relief from the
automatic stay or for adequate protection, which is denied by the bankruptcy court, is not sufficient to
trigger superpriority status if the collateral subsequently proves to be inadequate.
This narrow interpretation of Section 507(b) should serve as an important warning for creditors who
are oversecured with what appears
to be a comfortable equity cushion.
Constant collateral monitoring,
rather than just a sigh of relief, is key.
At the first indication that collateral
2SL.

KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

1!507.l2(l)(c)(ii) (15th ed. 1999).
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value has depreciated to the point
where additional protection is warranted, a motion fpr relief from the
stay or for an order prohibiting or
conditioning the use of the collateral
should be filed. Unless a motion is
filed that results in the provision of
adequate protection, under LNC Investments, the benefit of superpriority under Section 507(b) will be
unavailable. As indicated in that
case, a premature motion denied by
the bankruptcy court will not result·
in superpriority entitlement.26
26
For other decisions construing Section
507(b), see, ~.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir. 1994)
(sets forth three-point test that must be
passed for superpriority under Section
507(b): (i) adt;quate protection must have,
been provid@ previously and that protec-'
tion ultimately' must prove to be inadequate,
(ii) the secured creditor must have a claim
allowable under Section 507(a)(l), which
means that it is an administrative expense
under Section 503(b); and (iii) the claim
must have arisen under Section 362, 363, or
364(d)); In re Smith, 75 B.R. 365 (W.D. Va.
1987) (the claimant seeking superpriority
must have been provided with some form
of adequate protection at some earlier time
and that protection must later prove to be
inadequate); Discount Family Boats, Inc., '
233 B.R. 365 (Bankr. B.D. Tex. 1999),/n re
Greenwald, 205 B.R. 277 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1997);/n rel.ovay, 205 B.R. 85 (Bankr. B.D.
Tex. 1997); In re James B. Downing & Co.,
94 B.R. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (a
superpriority claim is predicated upon the
express granting of adequate protection to
the creditor). But see, Center Wholesale, Inc.,
759 F2d. 1440, 1451 n. 23 (9th Cir. 1985)
(expressing the view that Section 507(b)
permits courts to grant superpriority status
despite the fact that the creditor was never
provided with adequate protection initially;
"although not literally within the provisions
of section 507, [the creditor's injury] is
clearly within its spirit and deserves to be
remedied by granting its claim a
superpriority. ").
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